9 Ways The Steele Dossier and ICA Overlap
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1. Russian Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Election
Steele Dossier: Alleges that the Russian regime, under Vladimir Putin’s direction, orchestrated a campaign to influence the 2016 election by supporting Donald Trump and undermining Hillary Clinton. It claims Russia cultivated Trump for at least five years to sow discord in the US and weaken the Western alliance, with Putin personally endorsing the operation (Page 1). The dossier details a multi-pronged effort involving intelligence sharing, cyber operations, and propaganda to favor Trump and disrupt US politics (Pages 7-8, 11, 15).
ICA: Confirms that Putin ordered an influence campaign in the summer of 2016 to undermine public faith in US democracy, denigrate Clinton, and enhance Trump’s electoral prospects. It assesses that Russia’s actions were part of a broader strategy to disrupt the US-led liberal democratic order, representing an escalation from previous Russian influence efforts (Page 4). The ICA notes high confidence (CIA/FBI) and moderate confidence (NSA) in Russia’s preference for Trump, based on intelligence reporting and public Russian behavior (Page 4).
Similarity: Both documents assert a deliberate, Kremlin-directed campaign to interfere in the 2016 election, with a clear preference for Trump over Clinton. They frame Russia’s actions as aimed at destabilizing US politics and weakening Western alliances. The Steele dossier’s claim of a five-year cultivation of Trump (Page 1) aligns with the ICA’s view of a long-term Russian strategy to undermine US democracy (Page 4), though the ICA does not specify a timeline for Trump’s involvement.
2. Use of Cyber Operations and Leaked Materials
Steele Dossier: Describes Russian intelligence services, particularly the FSB and GRU, conducting cyber operations to gather compromising material ("kompromat") on Clinton, including hacked DNC emails. It alleges these were leaked via WikiLeaks to damage Clinton’s campaign, with the Kremlin maintaining "plausible deniability" through intermediaries (Pages 7-8). The dossier claims Trump’s team was aware of and supported these leaks, with Source E admitting Russian involvement in the DNC email disclosures (Page 7). It also mentions Romanian hackers and other operatives paid by both Russia and Trump’s team, operating under Kremlin direction (Page 35).
ICA: Details GRU cyber operations against US political targets, including the DNC, starting in March 2016. It confirms the GRU used the Guccifer 2.0 persona and DCLeaks.com to release hacked data publicly and through WikiLeaks, with high confidence that the GRU passed material to WikiLeaks (Pages 5, 10-11). The ICA notes specific instances, such as GRU actors exfiltrating DNC data by May 2016 and targeting Republican-affiliated domains, though it clarifies these were not used for vote tampering (Pages 10-12). It also highlights the use of Russia-based infrastructure and mobile broadband providers to obscure the source of leaks (Page 11).
Similarity: Both documents emphasize Russia’s use of cyber espionage to obtain and leak Democratic Party materials, particularly DNC emails, through WikiLeaks and related platforms. The Steele dossier’s reference to “plausible deniability” (Page 7) mirrors the ICA’s description of Russia’s use of cutouts like Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks.com to mask involvement (Page 11). Both note the strategic timing of leaks to maximize political damage to Clinton, though the Steele dossier’s claim of Trump team complicity (Page 7) is not corroborated in the ICA.
3. Kremlin’s Use of Media and Propaganda
Steele Dossier: Highlights Russia’s use of state-controlled media and intermediaries to amplify anti-Clinton narratives and promote Trump. It notes the Kremlin’s efforts to maintain deniability while pushing disinformation, such as through WikiLeaks and compliant media outlets (Pages 11, 15). The dossier also mentions Kremlin concerns about media fallout from the DNC leaks, prompting a cautious approach to avoid further escalation (Page 11).
ICA: Describes Russia’s state-run propaganda machine, including RT and Sputnik, as key platforms for Kremlin messaging. It details RT’s consistently negative coverage of Clinton, focusing on her alleged corruption and health issues, while portraying Trump as a victim of a corrupt establishment (Pages 13-14). The ICA notes RT’s collaboration with WikiLeaks, including RT’s editor-in-chief visiting Julian Assange in 2013 to discuss leaks (Page 12). It also cites pro-Kremlin trolls and social media campaigns, such as the Internet Research Agency, amplifying anti-Clinton narratives (Page 14).
Similarity: Both documents underscore Russia’s strategic use of state media and propaganda to shape US public opinion. The Steele dossier’s mention of Kremlin-orchestrated media efforts (Page 15) aligns with the ICA’s detailed account of RT and Sputnik’s role in promoting anti-Clinton narratives and supporting Trump (Page 13). Both highlight the use of third-party platforms like WikiLeaks to amplify leaks, with the ICA providing specific examples of RT’s programming, such as videos titled “Clinton and ISIS Funded by the Same Money” (Page 14).
4. Focus on Deniability and Covert Operations
Steele Dossier: Stresses Russia’s efforts to maintain “plausible deniability” through intermediaries like WikiLeaks, Russian émigrés, and organizations like Rossotrudnichestvo. It details covert meetings, such as Michael Cohen’s alleged Prague meetings in August 2016 with Kremlin representatives to manage the fallout from Manafort and Page’s exposures (Pages 18, 34-35). The dossier also describes the use of trusted agents in Kremlin-linked institutes to obscure direct ties (Page 32).
ICA: Notes that Russia’s influence campaign combined covert operations (e.g., GRU cyber intrusions) with overt propaganda, using cutouts, front organizations, and false-flag operations to create deniability. It identifies Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks.com as likely GRU operations and highlights WikiLeaks as a conduit for leaks, chosen for its reputation for authenticity (Pages 9-11). The ICA also mentions Russian attempts to obscure internet traffic sources using VPN services like King Servers (Page 12).
Similarity: Both documents emphasize Russia’s reliance on deniable methods to execute its influence campaign. The Steele dossier’s specific claims about Rossotrudnichestvo and Prague meetings (Pages 18, 34) complement the ICA’s broader description of cutouts and false-flag operations (Page 10). Both agree that WikiLeaks played a central role in disseminating hacked materials while allowing Russia to distance itself from direct involvement.
5. Targeting Clinton with Kompromat
Steele Dossier: Claims the Kremlin compiled a dossier of compromising material on Clinton, primarily consisting of bugged conversations and intercepted calls from her visits to Russia, controlled by Dmitriy Peskov under Putin’s direct orders. It suggests this material was considered for release to damage Clinton but had not been distributed to Trump’s team by June 2016 (Pages 1, 5-6). The dossier also mentions plans to exploit existing leaks to exacerbate divisions without releasing new material (Page 15).
ICA: States that Russia collected additional material on Clinton that could have been used to undermine her presidency, though it does not confirm a specific dossier. It notes Moscow’s intent to discredit Clinton and question her legitimacy, particularly by amplifying hacked email leaks and pushing narratives about her corruption (Pages 4, 9). The ICA suggests Russia held back some material for potential use against a Clinton administration (Page 9).
Similarity: Both documents indicate Russia’s intent to gather and potentially use compromising information on Clinton to weaken her campaign or presidency. The Steele dossier’s specific claim about a Peskov-controlled dossier (Page 6) aligns with the ICA’s broader assertion of Russia’s collection of damaging material (Page 9), though the ICA avoids specifics about the material’s nature or control.
6. Engagement with Trump Campaign Associates
Steele Dossier: Alleges direct coordination between Trump’s campaign team and Kremlin operatives, naming Paul Manafort, Carter Page, and Michael Cohen as key figures. It details secret meetings, such as Page’s July 2016 Moscow meeting with Igor Sechin and Diveykin, discussing sanctions relief and kompromat (Page 9), and Cohen’s alleged Prague meetings to manage fallout from Manafort’s Ukraine ties (Pages 18, 34-35). The dossier also claims a Rosneft stake was offered to Trump’s associates for lifting sanctions (Page 30).
ICA: Does not confirm direct coordination but acknowledges Russia’s preference for Trump and its engagement with US political figures. It mentions GRU collection on Republican-affiliated targets but lacks specifics on campaign interactions (Pages 4, 10-11). The ICA notes Russian support for figures like Jill Stein and Michael Flynn, who visited Moscow, but does not allege campaign collusion (Page 15).
Similarity: Both documents suggest Russian efforts to engage with individuals close to Trump to advance their objectives. The Steele dossier’s specific allegations about Page, Cohen, and Manafort (Pages 9, 18, 30) are more detailed than the ICA’s general reference to Russian engagement with US figures (Page 15). Both imply Russia sought to leverage relationships with Trump’s circle, though the ICA is cautious and does not corroborate the dossier’s specific claims.
7. Motivation to Undermine US Democracy and the Liberal Order
Steele Dossier: States that Putin’s primary aim was to sow discord in the US and weaken the transatlantic alliance, viewing Trump as a divisive figure who could disrupt the US-led liberal order. It cites a senior Russian financial official describing Putin’s desire for “Great Power” politics over the post-WWII ideals-based order (Page 2). The dossier frames Trump’s support as part of a strategy to destabilize Western unity (Pages 1-2, 28-29).
ICA: Assesses that Russia’s campaign was driven by a longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order. It highlights Putin’s fear and hatred of Clinton, whom he saw as a threat, and his preference for Trump as a disruptor of the US political system (Page 4). The ICA notes Russia’s goal to weaken US influence globally, with the election campaign as a key opportunity (Page 13).
Similarity: Both documents align on Russia’s overarching motive to destabilize US democracy and challenge the Western liberal framework. The Steele dossier’s reference to “Great Power” politics (Page 2) mirrors the ICA’s assessment of Russia’s aim to disrupt the liberal order (Page 4). Both see Trump as a vehicle for creating division, with Clinton as a primary target due to her perceived hostility to Russia.
8. Kremlin’s Strategic Evolution During the Campaign
Steele Dossier: Describes Russia’s tactical adjustments as the campaign progressed. Initially, the Kremlin aimed to boost Trump, but as Clinton’s victory seemed likely, it shifted to undermining her legitimacy (Page 15). The dossier notes internal Kremlin debates, with figures like Sergei Ivanov advocating caution due to backlash, and a decision to avoid new leaks while exploiting existing ones (Pages 11, 13-15). By October 2016, Putin reportedly grew disappointed with the impact of Clinton email leaks (Page 28).
ICA: States that Moscow’s approach evolved based on electoral prospects. Early in the campaign, Russia focused on helping Trump, but as Clinton’s win seemed probable, it shifted to undermining her future presidency by questioning her legitimacy and the election’s fairness (Page 4). The ICA notes Russia held back some influence efforts for potential later use, such as additional leaks (Page 9).
Similarity: Both documents highlight Russia’s adaptive strategy, shifting from supporting Trump to damaging Clinton’s legitimacy as electoral dynamics changed. The Steele dossier’s account of Kremlin caution after backlash (Page 11) aligns with the ICA’s note of Russia holding back some efforts to preserve deniability (Page 9). Both describe a pragmatic approach to maximizing long-term disruption.
9. Role of Key Russian Figures
Steele Dossier: Names specific Kremlin figures like Dmitriy Peskov, Sergei Ivanov, and Igor Sechin as central to the operation. Peskov is described as controlling the Clinton dossier and coordinating anti-Clinton efforts (Pages 1, 6), while Ivanov’s dismissal as Head of Presidential Administration is linked to mishandling the operation’s fallout (Pages 22-23). Sechin allegedly met with Carter Page to discuss sanctions relief (Page 30).
ICA: Refers to senior Russian officials broadly, with Putin as the primary decision-maker, but does not name specific operatives like Peskov or Sechin. It mentions propagandists like Dmitriy Kiselev shaping anti-Clinton narratives (Page 13) and notes the Kremlin’s use of diplomats like Sergei Kislyak, though not in operational detail (Page 22).
Similarity: Both documents confirm high-level Kremlin involvement, with Putin as the ultimate authority. The Steele dossier’s specific naming of Peskov and Ivanov (Pages 6, 22) complements the ICA’s broader reference to senior officials and propagandists (Page 13). Both indicate a top-down approach, though the Steele dossier provides more granular details on individual roles.